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Migration has been a key issue in many debates over Brexit. Polling 
evidence suggests that “control of borders” was a major motivating 
factor for many ‘Leave’ voters[1] and academic evidence suggests that 
it could have been the single biggest factor in the referendum[2]. It has 
certainly been the case that the UK has seen significant inward 
migration since around 1997, although only rarely has the rate of EU 
immigration exceeded that of non-EU immigration. However, the UK is 
not unique in Europe: elevated immigration levels have become a 
pan-European concern. 
Indeed, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands has been every bit as much 
of a vociferous opponent of Eastern European immigration as UKIP. 
Migration is a concern for many across Europe – from the ‘Front 
nationale’ in France (whose candidate, Marine Le Pen, garnered one-
third of second-round votes in the most recent presidential elections) 
to Viktor Orban in Hungary. Indeed, it is ironic that many of the 
countries that have provided a substantial source of immigrants for 
Western Europe since their accession to the EU are so hostile to 
immigration themselves. 
The purpose of this brief article is to consider the general overview of 
migration within Europe in recent years.  In general, the flow has been 
of East-to-West migration since the accession of several Eastern 
European states to the EU in 2004. This was later followed by 
significant South-to-North migration as a result of the Eurozone crisis 
in the early part of this decade. There are notable specific flows, with 
particularly large numbers moving to the UK and Ireland in the early 
post-accession years and later flows growing to Germany as that 
country’s labour market opened up. The UK and Ireland have 
continued to be popular destinations, perhaps partly due to their use 
of English and relatively accessible labour markets, although the 
Netherlands has also received very large numbers in total. The 
popularity of Germany particularly increased during the Eurozone 
crisis, with significant numbers of migrants moving northwards. France 
has seen somewhat lower levels of immigration from much of Eastern 
Europe with the notable exception of Romania, perhaps due to 
linguistic similarities. 
Migration is significant across Europe and has grown very significantly 
over the past 2 decades, particularly since 2004, although for many 
countries like the UK the process began earlier and has involved 
substantial migration from outside the EU (which is due to domestic 
policy and not regulated by the EU). Immigration rates vary 
substantially by country, with the highest rates generally seen in 
extremely small states (Luxembourg and Malta, for example, saw 
immigration of 3.92 and 3.81 people per 100 inhabitants in 2016). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Ireland and Sweden also see large inflows 
with immigration rates of 1.79% and 1.64% respectively in 2016 
alone. Naturally, net migration is considerably lower as a large 
number of immigrants choose to leave the countries subsequently. 
Austria (1.48% of population) and Germany (1.29% of population) 
also saw relatively elevated levels of immigration in 2016, which may 
be partly linked to refugee flows, although a comparatively strong 
economic performance has also attracted migrants from elsewhere in 
Europe in recent years. This has been particularly notable since the 
Eurozone crisis. 
The UK and Spain sit mid-table, which is a sharp turnaround from the 
years prior to the financial crisis when Spain saw large numbers of 
immigrants (including notable numbers from South America – hinting 
at the importance of language for accessing labour markets). Much 
lower rates are seen in many Southern and Eastern EU states 
(Portugal and Slovakia seeing immigration rates of just 0.29% and 
0.14% respectively). Again, this is gross immigration – many of these 
countries see net negative migration as the proportion of emigration is 
higher than that of immigration. 
Inward migration is more evenly spread than previously – whereas in 
2007 Spain saw far and away the largest number of foreign 
immigrants at 920,534 people with Germany and the UK in a rather 
distant second and third place (with just the former just over half-a-
million and the latter just under). The figures for Spain are particularly 
stunning given its much smaller population. By 2016 in contrast, a 
total of ten EU states saw immigration of over 100,000 non-nationals. 
Finally, these figures all include non-EU migration which has been 
very significant for a number of countries. Those along the 
Mediterranean have seen sporadic influxes from Africa (notably 
Eritrea) and the Near East, with the military situations in Iraq, Syria 
and Afghanistan providing significant numbers of migrants to Europe. 
Ex-colonial powers continue to see arrivals from former colonies, with 
India and Pakistan providing significant numbers to the UK and parts 
of Northern and Central Africa to France. Finally, there have been 
significant numbers moving into the Eastern countries of the EU from 
further East (with Ukraine to Poland a notable flow since the military 
conflagrations in recent years). Russia has also proved a significant 
source country for some countries in Europe. 
In this vein it is noteworthy that Theresa May has explicitly promised 
an end to unrestricted migration from EU countries after the end of 
any transition period. Naturally, this will equally affect Britons seeking 
to move to other parts of the EU. Nevertheless, given that a majority 
of migration to the UK comes from outside the EU (and has always 
been entirely under the control of the UK) it is difficult to see what the 
ultimate impact of this will be. In any event, it is clear that a number of 
nationalist figures throughout Europe also desire to dramatically 
reduce rates of immigration and will be watching what happens 
extremely closely. 
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